Archive for November, 2008

Two Key Questions about The Great Re-Leveraging AKA Bailouts

Sunday, November 30th, 2008

Let’s take another look at The Great Re-Leveraging AKA US Government bailouts, which tend to generally take one of three forms (or some combination):

(1) Government guarantee (as seen with money market funds, some bank loans, increased FDIC deposit coverage and, of course, a special guarantee for Citi’s ‘bad bank’ assets)

(2) Direct loans or preferred/quasi-common stocks investments (as seen with AIG, and the innumerable amount of banks that got the first half of TARP money).

(3) Liquidity sources (as seen with many of the Federal Reserve programs, designed to take assets - with ‘haircuts’ so questionable they make ‘comb overs’ look good.)

Add these up and what do you get?  Well, according to Bloomberg, we’re at $7.7 trillion and counting (http://bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601109&sid=arEE1iClqDrk&refer=home) and that was as of last week.  That’s about 1/2 of U.S. annual G.D.P.

Want another view of things?  Just take a look at the Federal Reserve and the FR Bank’s balance sheets (http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h41/Current/) — all very complicated, but they boil down to one plain fact:  Where the Fed once backed those green Federal Reserve Notes in our wallets with US Treasuries, we now have a Fed that has now ballooned its balance sheet by a factor of nearly 3 times versus a year ago due to bailout related activities.

One can argue all day about the importance of, the amount and the type of bailouts that have occured thus far, but one issue is clear:  The US Government is re-leveraging to combat the ‘Greatest Deleveraging in the History of the World’.  One hopes that this will all end up well and the US Government and economy can eventually get back to normal.  However, two major questions linger:

1 - How many more bailouts, of how much, what type and for how long, and….

2 - How (and when) might things ‘get back to normal’?

An answer to question one will require a coherent strategy - something not yet divulged to ‘we the people’.  I would seriously recommend the new Administration propose such a strategy for all to view and understand.

An answer to question two will allow investment managers to develop tactical strategies (to go with strategic asset allocation decisions) that take into account when the force of ‘mean reversion’ might return to the fore.  Remember that nearly all investment manager decisions are based upon long term relationships reasserting themselves.  However, in the current liquidity and credit challenged markets, long term relationships have been virtually thrown out the window.  Thus, how and when things ‘get back to normal’ is perhaps the most challenging question facing investment managers today….and worthy of detailed discussions with your manager as it relates to your company’s portfolio. 

As for the USA, a larger unknown that could be solved by the answer to question two is the probability that, at some point, investors and other countries might rachet up their assessment of US Government currency and/or credit risk.  The result might be a much lower dollar and a higher yield demanded on those ‘risk less’ Treasuries.

Yes, Virginia, there may be a Santa Claus, and sometimes the US Government tries to act like St. Nick when it comes to bailouts.  However, bailouts don’t come down our collective chimney without a cost.  Perhaps by answering the two questions noted here, we might get a better idea of what we are truly receiving.

 

Let’s Say You Run a Bank…A Modest Proposal

Tuesday, November 18th, 2008

 …You wake up Monday morning and realize that loans are defaulting at faster rates than expected. You just increase loss reserves and go back to work, but…

…You wake up Tuesday morning and your CFO tells you all of your investments, including your loans, must be ‘marked to market’. That means recognizing losses on your loans before they actually happen, but that’s OK because that’s why you’ve got a loan loss reserve. Unfortunately, the ‘market’ is not what you expect to lose, but what other investors think the loans are worth. And, lo and behold, those investors think they are worth a lot less than you do. It does not matter that you intend to hold those loans until they pay off, default or otherwise disappear from the balance sheet. What matters is what others think they are worth today. And those others don’t have all of the information on the loan that you do, so, naturally a lack of ‘transparency’ produces a discounted price versus true value. Oh well, you say, I guess we’ve got more losses to take. But, then your CFO tells you those losses will eat into capital and without enough capital, you’ve got no bank. So…
 
…You wake up Wednesday morning and hear about the TARP program. What, they won’t buy are underperforming assets? That’s bad news, but wait…they will give us capital. Will it be enough to make up for our ‘mark to market’ losses? No, but, hey, some capital is better than none when you’re facing a viability problem due to the silliness of ‘mark to market’ for assets you intend to hold until the end of their time.   And, this will keep those pesky depositors from pulling money out of your bank, ‘chosen’ as a survivor by the US Treasury. So…
 
…You wake up Thursday morning and enter your bank’s credit committee meeting. “How’s loan production?”, you ask, since good loans earn more interest than investing in those low interest rate Treasury bills and notes. “What loan production, chief?” the committee says, “We can’t make loans until we fill that hole in our capital provided by those ‘mark to market’ losses.” “I knew that TARP capital would never be enough,” you say, “but what can we do, but sit tight until we have enough accumulated earnings to fill the hole. And when, Mr. CFO, will that be?” “Time heals all wounds,” murmurs Mr. CFO, who retires to his office and the blinking Bloomberg showing more bad news in the financial markets.   So…
 
…You wake up Friday morning and talk to your fellow bank CEO’s. “What are you guys doing with your TARP money,” you ask. “Holding on for dear life,” your peers say. “Well, if we can’t help ourselves, it’s back to the government for more help before we can increase loan production.” This thought gets you to stare at the list of the worst assets held by your bank, REO, real estate owned better known as foreclosures. “If only…”  And the week ends.
 
That’s the impact of the TARP in a nutshell. Woefully short and only addressing part of the problem. There are many potential solutions to the current financial crisis, some good, some bad, some a bit of both.  Thus, we pose our own modest proposal:
 
-          Forced closings/mergers of the weakest banks (we saw that with PNC and National City, one would hope for more) Use the TARP (and it will take even more cash) to assist in recapitalizations when needed. As we saw in our little vignette above, total capital contributions should equal total losses before the banks will loosen the credit reins.
 
-          Purchase of ALL foreclosed real estate from the balance sheet of all financial institutions at today’s market value by a newly created agency of the US Government. This agency can then manage the assets while taking them off the market for the foreseeable future. The agency would indeed become the biggest landlord in the country, but would help put a floor under real estate prices…one of the fire starters of the current financial crisis.
 
-          Follow the lead of the FDIC in working with portfolio lenders to restructure loans in foreclosure with the goal of improving the present value of expected cash flows from any restructuring.
 
-          Recognize that in the best of circumstances the recovery of the financial and real estate markets is a multi year project.  And, yes this has real impacts on your investment strategy.
 
Now, if you ran a bank…wouldn’t you like this modest proposal? This would be step one in getting the banking system to support the recovery of the real economy.
 
Will we see this solution? Probably not, but it will be interesting to see what future solutions are presented by the new US administration and how they compare to these proposals.
 
 
 

Welcome…

From the Northwest Quadrant. We chose that name for this blog for its multiple meanings and to highlight a new beginning. Investment professionals are all familiar with the preference for building portfolios that are in the Northwest Quadrant of the risk/reward graph — improved return with lower risk. And, those of you who know Strategic Asset Alliance (SAA) know that our headquarters are located in the Northwest Quadrant of the lower 48 United States - Bellingham, WA. Of course, those of you who know SAA also know that our approach to improving the investment process, and with it the financial results, of our insurer clients goes well beyond the typical efficient frontier risk/reward graphing so familiar to pensions, endowments, foundations and others. And, that is the main purpose of this blog. To provide an ongoing commentary on how INSURERS can go beyond the business as usual approach to investments and improve their financial results, with the Northwest Quadrant as a point of departure. Your comments are most welcome on any entry in this blog. And, simultaneously with the introduction of this blog, SAA is introducing the Insurer Investment Forum Online - an opportunity to enjoy an ongoing Q&A with your peers and other experts on the investment process for insurers. Like Lewis and Clark, we stand in the Northwest Quadrant together ready to forge a new approach, but this time to improve the insurance invesment process for insurers. I hope you will join me on this adventure.

 

 

 
   

Home : About : Investment Process : Case Studies : Media : Contact : Blog : Forum


© 2007-2009 Strategic Asset Alliance : Site by ioCreative